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Abstract
The insights presented in this article are outcomes of a security research project that was initiated to collate and interpret
the latest findings gathered in the domain of air traffic management security. The concept of a holistic approach to security
management has been evaluated. Due to the large scope of the project, only an excerpt of the findings is provided in this
article. This article focuses on a brief description of a security prototype validation methodology, developed within the
project. To provide tangible application of the methodology, the adoption to a security prototype is developed, which is
intended to enhance security of the air traffic control voice communication system.
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1 Introduction
One underestimated challenge to the existing air traffic
management (ATM) is the existence of security threats
imposed by intentional attacks on the infrastructure.
Security measures to avoid exploitation of vulnerabilities,
or to mitigate successful exploitation, have increased both
in number and in their effectiveness over time [1]. Nev-
ertheless, since the main impact on ATM on September 11,
2001, the awareness about new and serious threats has
increased. This consequently results in the need for security
solutions which propose (1) security controls to avoid the
penetration of the ATM system, (2) measures to mitigate
the influence of successful intrusion, and (3) countermea-
sures to keep the impact on the ATM system at
acceptable levels.
Programs to toughen up ATM for the future such as
SESAR, NextGen, or CARATS provide extensive guid-
ance material for enhancing safety and security [2–4].
However, when it comes to implementation, the number of
projects or initiatives is extremely small.
The Project GAMMA1 marked the first implementation
of SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) guidance
material regarding security risk assessment and treatment.
The work in the project followed the Security Risk
Assessment (SecRAM) [2] and treatment postulated by
SESAR. This was accompanied by the application of the
minimum set of security controls (MSSC) [3]. As a sum-
mary, the following steps were taken in the development
phase of GAMMA regarding all kinds of processes
throughout the known ATM:
• Identify the primary and supporting assets.
• Identify vulnerabilities.
• Invent the attack scenarios.
• Name the security objectives.
• Analyze and treat the risks.
• Define security controls.
This article discusses a subset of the project outcomes. It
briefly describes the postulated security prototype valida-
tion methodology and, more comprehensively, its practical
application. This may be used as the blueprint and an
example for validating other ATM security-oriented
systems.
A dedicated prototype for secure air traffic control
(ATC) voice communication shall serve as a practical
example for applying the described validation methodol-
ogy. This prototype will close the known security
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vulnerability of open, analogue, and unsecured air–ground
voice communication which is still widely used in ATC.
Strategies to counteract this security threat have already
been investigated, such as the promising approach of
adding an almost unnoticeable digital watermark signature
to every audio transmission, which can be decoded and
used to identify the station from which the corresponding
transmission was sent. This solution is primarily intended
to submit aircraft identification tags (AIT) to ATC, but it
can be used in the same way to confirm the identification of
the responsible ATC unit to pilots. Several studies have
shown the technical feasibility [5–7]. Nevertheless, this
(intrusive) approach would require a change of technical
radio equipment.
The prototype described in this article uses a new, non-
intrusive approach to secure the air–ground voice com-
munication. More information regarding the concept of this
prototype and the conducted validation is given below.
2 Validation approach for security
prototypes in ATM
Another important goal of the GAMMA project is the
validation of the newly developed security controls (en-
hanced to security prototypes). The security controls rep-
resent the core element of the postulated holistic security
concept [8].
The validations in this project were set up according to
the protocols of the European Operational Concept Vali-
dation Methodology (E-OCVM) [9]. E-OCVM attempts to
make the expected benefit measureable. After verification
of the system, the next task is to find out if ‘‘the right
system was built’’ (the driving question of validation). The
overarching question is: are the newly introduced systems
and functions (respectively, processes) worth
implementing?
To shorten up the work done in the project, the resulting
approach to successfully validate ATM security prototypes
consists of the following steps:
• Define security key performance indicators (KPI) to
quantify the efficiency of the security controls.
• Set up the validation plan including specific validation
goals, metrics, and acceptance criteria.
• Conduct the validation exercises.
• Evaluate the results.
The above shall now be elaborated in the following
chapters taking one prototype as a tangible example.
3 An example: the SACom prototype
The secure ATC communications (SACom) prototype is a
modular system which was developed as one of seven
prototypes within the project, which were designed to close
known security gaps in present or near future ATM systems
[10]. Air–ground voice communication was recently
described again to be one of the most endangered com-
munication means for spoofing and/or spamming [11]. In
particular, the SACom aims at improving the security of
air–ground voice communication between pilots and air
traffic control. For decades, this communication has been
performed with analogue radio transceivers, which neither
use encryption techniques nor are in any other way secure
[12]. Physically, the air–ground communication is freely
accessible and can easily be eavesdropped. Apart from the
availability of appropriate radio communication equip-
ment, there is no technical hurdle which has to be over-
come for an unauthorized person to take part and disturb
the ATC–pilot communication. The security threat which is
now in the focus is the insertion of ‘‘fake ATC clearances’’
by an unauthorized speaker with the goal to seriously spoil
the safe, orderly and economic flow of air traffic. Recent
examples for such security events are published in [13, 14].
The SACom prototype uses voice analysis algorithms to
verify the speaker identity of every utterance like proposed
in [15]. The prototype furthermore adds several other
indicators of a different nature. This combination of several
indicators is done to not just identify a possible unautho-
rized transmission directly, but also to detect likely con-
sequences of a successful inserted ‘‘fake ATC clearance’’.
This approach is expected to make the system more robust,
for example, in case of (1) failing to determine a single
indicator, (2) false results of a single indicator, or (3) a
single indicator being bypassed by the attacker, e.g., by
voice reproduction software. In addition to that, it makes
the system more flexible: SACom indicators can also
provide benefits in other security/safety incidents, for
example, hijacking or emergencies.
The detailed concept is described in the following
section.
3.1 Concept of the SACom prototype
The SACom prototype is designed as a pure detection
system. It continuously monitors the audio stream of the
air–ground voice communication as well as the position
and behaviour of the air traffic. The prototype directly
detects (1) unauthorized transmissions (e.g., ‘‘fake ATC
clearances’’) by means of voice analysis, but it also detects
possible consequences of such transmissions, (2) increased
stress level of all participants exposed to the incident, (3)
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aircraft deviating from the cleared flight path while react-
ing to unauthorized transmissions, or (4) valid ATC
clearances with the potential of a collision risk.
The basic idea of the SACom prototype is not just to
provide, but also to combine and correlate all these indi-
cators. Apart from increased robustness and flexibility, this
shall enable the detection of either attempted or success-
fully infiltrated ‘‘fake ATC clearances’’. It shall also help to
distinguish them from events with a pure safety back-
ground (unintentional mistakes in air–ground voice com-
munication such as callsign mix-up, navigation errors,
etc.). It must be considered that circumstances without any
safety or security threat can also trigger individual SACom
indicators (e.g., a student pilot under high stress). In this
context, it is assumed that such events often trigger only
one of the SACom indicators (1)–(4), while security events
likely trigger more than one of these indicators at once and/
or repeatedly.
It was one of the design requirements for the SACom
prototype that it shall not modify or manipulate the existing
air–ground voice communication (e.g., by means of
encryption, by adding audio signatures/watermarks, by
blocking content, etc.). Furthermore, the SACom prototype
has to be able to automatically report security-relevant
information to a defined security management entity (e.g.,
a Security Operation Center) [8].
As SACom is a pure detection system, the initiation of
countermeasures still rests with the person using this sys-
tem [e.g., the air traffic controller (ATCo)]. Therefore, the
SACom primarily increases the situational awareness and
enables the user to react more quickly and more appro-
priately to such security-relevant events as time plays a key
role in handling them.
The SACom:
• Enables the recipient of a message to directly identify
‘‘fake ATC clearances’’ (by verifying the speaker
identity).
• Can provide a rough indication concerning the current
workload or confusion (by providing stress detection
functions).
• Acts as a safety net (by providing conflict detection
functions).
• Enables all users to immediately initiate corrective
measures concerning the affected traffic (e.g., correct-
ing aircraft deviating from their clearance).
• Enables all users to initiate preventive measures
concerning traffic which is not (yet) affected (e.g., by
sending aircraft to a backup frequency, increasing the
separation between aircraft or reducing the traffic load
on the ATC sector).
• Significantly accelerates the passing of security-rele-
vant information to entities responsible for security
management (security operation centers, authorities,
etc.) by automatic reports.
According to the desired functions, the SACom proto-
type has a modular architecture and consists of the fol-
lowing sub-systems:
• Speaker verification module containing the voice
authorization function (SV).
• Stress detection module containing the stress detection
function (SD).
• Conformance monitoring module containing confor-
mance monitoring (CM) and conflict detection func-
tions (CD).
• Security management interface containing the correla-
tion function and automatic reporting functions.
Speaker verification and stress detection modules
require the input of the audio stream from the air–ground
voice communication as well as a database of known and
authorized speakers. These modules deliver a score value
to the security management interface. A low speaker ver-
ification score indicates a mismatch of the voice of an
utterance with the known voice characteristics of autho-
rized speakers. A high stress score indicates the presence of
known voice patterns that are typical for stressed speech in
this utterance based on known parameters. The confor-
mance monitoring module requires the input of surveil-
lance data as well as complete, correct and up-to-date data
about given ATC clearances.
The conformance monitoring function of this module
works on one hand in a trajectory-based way for moni-
toring aircraft along complete flight paths such as approach
procedures or arrival routes. On the other hand, it is also
done in a non-trajectory-based format for explicitly
instructed levels, headings, speeds, and rates of climb/
descent.
The conflict detection function of this module in the
same way consists of two parts. Received ATC clearances
are on one hand converted into a predicted trajectory. On
the other hand, the current aircraft state vector is simply
extended to predict the future positions of aircraft in case of
no further aircraft manoeuvers. Both predictions are con-
tinuously cross-checked for all known flights to detect
possible conflicts in the future (in an adjustable time per-
iod). These detected conflicts may be caused by the given
(maybe false) ATC clearances or by the current aircraft
movements if they are maintained. The conflict detection
function, therefore, can well be compared to the very
common short-term conflict alert function (STCA) of state-
of-the-art ATC radar systems, but also covers the medium-
term conflict detection (MTCD) which today is mainly
used in the upper airspace [16, 17].
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In case of detected deviations from the given ATC
clearance or predicted collision risks between two aircraft,
the conformance monitoring module will give appropriate
alerts.
The security management interface requires the input
of at least one of the above-mentioned modules and
produces a correlated score value. According to the con-
cept described above, this correlated score combines the
different individual SACom indications and shall provide
a specific value representing the overall security threat
situation. The correlated score is obtained by adding up
all individual indicators in a defined time period, applying
weighting factors and again adding them up to an overall
score.
A low-correlated score indicates normal operations,
while a rapidly increasing score indicates suspicion of the
presence of an unauthorized speaker inserting false
instructions. This score is used by the prototype as a trigger
for automatic alerting and reporting functions together with
a defined alert threshold. The raw data and/or the correlated
score can automatically be submitted to a security man-
agement entity or directly provided to user displays (air
traffic controller tools or cockpit systems of a pilot).
Figure 1 sketches the architecture of the SACom pro-
totype including different modules as well as inputs and
outputs.
The speaker verification module and the stress detection
module were developed and built by the Institute of
Informatics, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava,
Slovakia. The conformance monitoring module and the
security management interface were developed and built by
the Institute of Flight Guidance, German Aerospace Center
(DLR), Braunschweig, Germany.
3.2 Simulator implementation
The air traffic management and operations simulator
(ATMOS) of DLR’s Institute of Flight Guidance located in
Braunschweig is an experimental facility for simulating air
traffic in real time. In a simulated airspace, the ATMOS can be
used to test, e.g., newprocedures,ATMconcepts, or supporting
systems in terms of safety, feasibility, efficiency, and traffic
capacity. This facility allows researchers and air traffic con-
trollers to jointly evaluate newworkingmethods for controlling
and influencing air traffic. One area of research is determining
the strain on controllers, including critical situations.
The simulator is primarily designed for performing
assessments with interacting participants, which is why the
traffic situations have to be simulated in real time. It is
generally possible to use any airspace in the world,
including one or more airports as desired. If necessary, the
selected airport can be adjusted in line with different air
traffic control sectors.
As shown in Fig. 2, the facility consists of five con-
troller working positions (CWP), a supervisor working
position and six pseudo-pilot working positions (PP). The
air traffic generator used to establish simulated traffic is the
NARSIM (NLR’s Air Traffic Control Research Simulator).
The system is completed with a flexible software solution
(YADA) for voice over IP (VoIP) communication between
controllers and pseudo-pilots.
This simulation facility was dedicated as the validation
platform to conduct the security validation of the SACom
prototype.
SACom Prototype
Speaker
verification module
Stress detection
module
Security management
interface
Conformance
monitoring module
Radar dataRadar
data
voice
communication
Module
outputs
- System status
- correlation indicator /
score
ATC
clearances
Flight plan
data
CWP
Indications
Fig. 1 Architecture of the SACom prototype
Fig. 2 Simulation facility ATMOS
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The speaker verification module and the stress detection
module were implemented as a software application on the
supervisorworking position. This software is granted a direct
access to the voice communication audio stream, while the
built-in database of authorized speakers could be changed or
enhanced using a graphical user interface (GUI).
A separate controller working position (CWP1) housed
the conformance monitoring module and the security
management interface. In addition, an SQL database was
used as data exchange interface between all prototype
modules as well as the simulator components (NARSIM).
This database was also managed from this station. The
security management interface was equipped with a con-
nection to an external security management entity. Auto-
matic alerts and reports to this entity are passed through a
separate module based on Apache KAFKA due to the local
network architecture used in the simulator environment. As
an example, this security management entity could be the
security management platform, which is another security
prototype developed by Leonardo, Italy.
The workstation CWP5 was intended to be used by the
test person acting as radar approach controller during the
validation trials. The radar display software was also able
to access the SQL database on CWP1, which contained all
alerts related to the SACom prototype.
Figure 3 illustrates the SACom implementation in the
ATMOS which was just described above.
4 Validation methodology and validation
objectives
The principle fitness for purpose of a technical mean is
shown when it meets postulated requirements. Conse-
quently, a prototype is fit for purpose—and, therefore,
fulfils the research question—if it satisfies the requirements
to address the threat. How well the prototype satisfies these
requirements may be difficult to assess; therefore, the next
task is to split these requirements into more measurable
sub-requirements, which are reflected in security key per-
formance indicators. Examples for this approach as well as
possible general security key performance indicators (e.g.,
number of supporting assets affected, recorded time until
mitigation of the attack, etc.) are available in [18].
Furthermore, the system configurations for baseline and
conceptual solution have to be determined.
In case of the SACom prototype, the attack scenario
consists of an intruder into the ATC voice communication
who interacts with aircraft and issues deliberately safety
critical instructions to pilots (‘‘False Air Traffic Con-
troller’’—‘‘False ATCo’’). The overall goal of the exercise
is to validate whether or not the SACom prototype is fit for
purpose to address this threat.
The validation objectives which were addressed in the
validation exercise are the following:
• To validate that the SACom prototype as a composition
of different indicators supports the detection of a ‘‘False
ATCo’’ attack or its consequences.
• To validate that the SACom prototype is usable, useful
and leads to a better situational awareness of the user
when reacting to a ‘‘False ATCo’’ attack or its
consequences.
• To validate that the performance of the SACom
prototype is acceptable for a system in this state of
development.
In general, these validation objectives are considered as
fulfilled when:
• determined System Usability Scale (SUS) scores are
above 50;
• scores for user trust in the system (SATI) are above 2
(= ‘‘sometimes’’);
• detection rates are considerably higher than false alarm
rates;
• times until detection are equal or better than human
performance.
The objectives were the basis to elaborate several KPI
which are specific to the prototype and its functions. These
KPIs are the following:
Fig. 3 SACom prototype implementation in ATMOS
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• Speaker verification: false alarm rate Number of
authorized transmissions which were incorrectly clas-
sified as unauthorized transmissions, divided by the
total number of authorized transmissions.
• Speaker verification: detection rate Number of unau-
thorized transmissions which were correctly classified
as unauthorized transmissions, divided by the total
number of unauthorized transmissions.
• Stress detection: false alarm rate Number of utterances
which are believed to be free of stress but nevertheless
show a stress score above a defined alert threshold,
divided by the total number of utterances which are
believed to be free of stress.
• Stress detection: detection rate Number of utterances
which are believed to be compromised with stress and
which show a stress score above a defined alert
threshold, divided by the total number of utterances
which are believed to be compromised with stress.
• Conformance monitoring: false alarm rate Number of
incorrect conformance monitoring alerts, divided by the
total number of all conformance monitoring alerts.
• Conformance monitoring: detection rate Number of
correctly detected deviations from a valid ATC clear-
ance, divided by the total number of deviations from a
valid ATC clearance. This KPI was determined for the
performance of the SACom prototype but also for the
performance of the ATCo.
• Conformance monitoring: time until detection Time
difference between the timestamp when the deviation
was detected and the timestamp when the deviation
could have been detected at the earliest. This KPI was
determined for the performance of the SACom proto-
type but also for the performance of the ATCo.
• Conflict detection: false alarm rate Number of incor-
rect conflict alerts, divided by the total number of all
conflict alerts.
• Conflict detection: detection rate Number of correctly
detected conflict situations, divided by the total number
of all conflict situations. This KPI was determined for
the performance of the SACom prototype but also for
the performance of the ATCo.
• Correlation: false alarm rate Number of seconds of a
simulation where the correlation score went beyond a
defined alert threshold without the presence of a ‘‘False
ATCo’’ attack, divided by the total number of seconds
of a simulation without the presence of a ‘‘False
ATCo’’ attack.
• Correlation: detection rate Number of seconds of a
simulation where the correlated score went beyond a
defined alert threshold during the presence of a ‘‘False
ATCo’’ attack, divided by the total number of seconds
of a simulation with a presence of a ‘‘False ATCo’’
attack.
• Correlation: time until detection Time difference
between the timestamp of the first ‘‘False ATCo’’
action and the time stamp where the correlated score
reached a defined alert threshold.
• User acceptance This KPI is reflected in the SUS score
(system usability) as well as the SATI score (situational
awareness), obtained from the questionnaires.
The application of the validation methodology led to the
validation procedure described hereafter and was a
straightforward approach to provide evidence that the
SACom prototype is fit for purpose, to fulfill the postulated
requirements, to achieve the validation goals and to meet
pre-defined acceptance criteria corresponding to security
key performance indicators.
5 Validation procedure
As the SACom system could be used in aircraft cockpits
and at controller working positions, it should be validated
for both use cases.
The procedure described in the following always refers
to the validation of the SACom installed on the ATC side.
The validation of the SACom used in aircraft cockpits is
not considered further in this article.
It was decided to perform the validation of the SACom
prototype as human-in-the-loop real-time simulation.
Active air traffic controllers from the German Air Navi-
gation Service Provider DFS and from the Australian Air
Navigation Service Provider Air Services Australia were
recruited as test persons to take part in the validation
campaign.
5.1 Steps of a validation run
To reflect the validation methodology described above, the
following validation procedure was chosen:
1. Briefing of the test person
The test person taking part in the simulations is com-
prehensively briefed about the projects’ concept, the sim-
ulation trials, about the working environment and about the
goal of the validation campaign.
2. Adding the test person to the database of authorized
speakers (voice enrolment)
The test person is asked to read a number of prepared
ATC clearances. This audio stream is recorded and used to
create a new voice enrolment for the speaker verification
module. Afterwards, the test person reads again the same
prepared ATC clearances to verify if the reliability of the
new enrolment is sufficient.
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3. Simulator training
The simulator training is performed as a short-time
simulation with low workload to give the test person the
opportunity to make himself or herself familiar with the
airspace structure, the local operating procedures, and the
used CWP equipment. No SACom indications are dis-
played to the controller in this simulation. Nevertheless,
this step is already used to test the stress detection function
for evaluation of false alarms. Due to the low workload, it
is expected that no stress is present in this simulation.
4. Short-time simulations
The next step of one validation run is a set of 20 short-
time simulations, split up into four blocks consisting of five
short-time scenarios each. These short-time simulations
contain pre-defined safety or security events which cause
aircraft to deviate from given clearances or even introduce
a collision risk between two aircraft. The task of the test
person is to react to these events while providing ATC
service to all aircraft under control. The SACom prototype
will work in the background, but the corresponding indi-
cations will not be displayed to the controller. More
information about this validation step is given in
Chapter 5.3.
5. SACom briefing
In this validation step, the SACom prototype is intro-
duced to the test person. He or she is briefed about the
functions, the purpose, and corresponding indications on
the controller’s Human–Machine Interface (HMI).
6. SACom training
This is a short-time simulation run with low workload. It
is used to give the test person the opportunity to become
acquainted with the SACom indications which were just
briefed.
7. Long simulation run containing a complete security
incident
This validation step consists of a 45 min simulation run,
which contains a phase of normal operations (15 min), a
phase of multiple intrusions of an unauthorized person into
the air–ground voice communication (20 min) and again a
phase of normal operations. The test person has the task to
react to these events and to compensate the effects as much
as possible by making use of the SACom functions. More
information about this validation step is given in Sect. 5.4.
8. Questionnaires
In the next step, the test person is then asked to give
answers to prepared online questionnaires. These are
standardized questionnaires aiming at situational awareness
(Situational Awareness for SHAPE (SASHA) Question-
naire of EUROCONTROL [19]), usability (System
Usability Scale (SUS) [20]), and trust (SHAPE Automation
Trust Index (SATI) [21]). In addition, tailor-made ques-
tionnaires are filled which focus on very specific aspects of
interest. Such aspects may be, e.g., realism of the valida-
tion exercise, the GAMMA concept as whole or potential
improvements.
9. Debriefing
Each validation run ends with a de-briefing session.
Here, the controller can give any other feedback and the
validation exercise is discussed.
5.2 CWP equipment and working environment
For all simulations, the same equipment was installed at the
CWP:
• A radar display respecting EUROCONTROL’s recom-
mendations for air traffic control radar systems as far as
feasible and reasonable within research [22].
• The open source voice over IP radio communication
simulator YADA [23].
• A separate speech recognition system which delivers
necessary data about given ATC clearances [24] with
the possibility to make manual inputs.
The simulated airspace was the terminal control area of
Du¨sseldorf airport, Germany. The test person acted as radar
approach controller guiding the aircraft from the initial
contact to the final approach segment. The simulated traffic
consisted of flights approaching under Instrument Flight
Rules (IFR). Runway 23R of Du¨sseldorf airport was used
for all landings. No departures or flights under visual flight
rules were simulated.
Minimum vectoring altitude was defined to be 3000 ft
MSL in general for simplification, because all invited
controllers did not hold local ratings for the Du¨sseldorf
approach sector.
All flights had to be separated using the standard radar
separation or standard vertical separation (3NM lateral
separation and 1000 ft vertical separation).
5.3 Short-time simulations
The reason for choosing several short-time scenarios
instead of one big scenario is the need for comparability
and the need to produce a sufficient amount of data.
It often depends on exact traffic constellations and an
exact timing whether specific events can be simulated
equally for all exercise runs. Having said this, a long
simulation run is far too dynamic and offers too much
flexibility for the evolution of the traffic situation. From the
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simulation design point of view, it is nearly impossible to
inject exactly the same events with exactly the same con-
sequences in different validation runs when using long
simulation scenarios. Practically, only the first few minutes
of a simulation can be considered as comparable by setting
specific initial aircraft positions, state vectors, and traffic
constellations. Nevertheless, due to the differences in per-
formance, work habits, and experience from controller to
controller, it is absolutely natural and cannot be completely
avoided that the same traffic situation may be solved in a
different way every time.
When using a set of short-time scenarios instead, it is
possible to set up pre-defined traffic constellations and state
vectors recurrently, confronting all test persons with
exactly the same preconditions.
For the SACom validation, 20 short-time simulations
were performed. Each simulation took between 3 and
6 min and contained a pre-defined traffic situation as well
as pre-defined events with a safety or security background.
All those events are categorized and were distributed over
the short-time simulations according to their nature, which
can be:
• Lateral, vertical, or speed deviations.
• Manoeuvers without any clearance.
• Wrong compliance with a new clearance, e.g., a left
turn instead of a right turn.
• Non-compliance to a new clearance.
• Deviations caused by safety issues (e.g., technical
failures).
• Deviations caused by security issues (e.g., simulated
fake ATC clearances).
All short-time scenarios need to be completed by the test
person without SACom support, which allows the direct
comparison of the performance of the unsupported air
traffic controller (= ‘‘baseline’’) with the performance of
the SACom prototype (= ‘‘best case conceptual solution’’).
Figure 4 gives an example of short-time scenario num-
ber 16 as it was simulated during the validation trials.
In this short-time scenario (like in all other short-time
scenarios), several aircrafts are placed along the published
approach procedures of Du¨sseldorf Airport (BIKMU23 and
DOMUX23 transitions) in a defined altitude, at a defined
heading, with a defined speed and with defined initial ATC
clearances. The task of the test person is to guide the air-
craft until the final approach segment.
The pre-defined event in this example is a simulated
fake ATC clearance given by an unauthorized person to
BER621J. This fake clearance is issued at waypoint DL455
and instructs this flight to discontinue the approach and to
climb straight ahead to flight level 70. The intention of this
fake clearance is to cause a collision hazard with SXS36 V,
which follows the BIKMU 23 transition in flight level 70,
overflying the runway centerline.
To make sure that this pre-defined event can success-
fully be simulated, it is important to design every situation
in a way which leaves only very few options open to guide
the traffic. With regard to the example presented above,
this is on one hand achieved by placing BER621J on the
final track. It is very unlikely that a controller turns this
aircraft away, because it is short prior reaching the final
approach segment. On the other hand, to avoid that the
controller changes the flight path of SXS36V, the DOMUX
23 transition is occupied by other aircraft (SWR1129,
AEE482, and GWI21C), leaving no gap open where
SXS36V could be fed in directly.
5.4 Security incident simulation
Within this simulation, a complete intrusion of an unau-
thorized person infiltrating fake ATC clearances into air–
ground voice is simulated.
This simulation was designed to last 45 min, while a
medium workload is imposed.
During the first 15 min, no special event will be simu-
lated (normal operations). The main purpose of this phase
is to observe the SACom prototype in a situation without
any threat and to investigate if and why false alarms occur
and how they affect the correlation function.
In the second phase of the simulation, an unauthorized
speaker will insert fake ATC clearances to cause a collision
risk between two aircraft or at least confusion and an
Fig. 4 Short-time scenario number 16
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increased workload, which may lead to a loss of safety and
capacity. The second phase was planned with a length of
20 min, whereas the unauthorized speaker tries to inject
fake clearances at intervals of at least 90 s and after 300 s
at the latest (rule of thumb). As potentially dangerous
unlawful actions cannot be predetermined and planned
before, the person acting as unauthorized speaker needs to
have knowledge in air traffic control procedures and has to
decide spontaneously according to the traffic situation just
as a real attacker would do. To simulate block-out effects
in voice communication and to increase the probability that
the interference is not immediately detected, the pseudo-
pilots are instructed not to read back all of the given fake
clearances.
The main purpose of this second phase is to observe the
correlation process of the SACom prototype while being
exposed to a security threat, but also to learn more about
the typical reactions and countermeasures of an air traffic
controller experiencing such an attack.
The third phase of this simulation again contains normal
operations without any interference, because the SACom
prototype should also cease to produce warnings after the
incident is over.
6 Results’ overview
During late summer and fall of 2016, several validation
exercises were performed, which are listed in Table 1.
6.1 Assessment of validation results
Figure 5 shows the relations between the KPIs (right) and
the exercise steps (left), which create the data needed to
determine the individual KPIs (SV = Speaker Verification,
SD = Stress Detection, CM = Conformance Monitoring,
and CD = Conflict Detection).
Some of the steps will be described in more detail below
to give a better understanding of the result assessment.
6.1.1 Enrolment
During this exercise step, the test person is added to the
database of authorized speakers. Participants were asked to
read a defined number of phrases one after the other. All
utterances are recorded and fed into the speaker verification
module to extract the voice characteristics.
6.1.2 Simulator training
All participants conducted a training session within this
facility to familiarize with the setup, the system, and the
software. During the simulator training, it is expected that
no stress is present due to the very low workload and the
low demands. In this simulation, the controllers were
instructed to ‘‘play’’ with all the CWP functions and to
make themselves familiar with them.
Nevertheless, as the stress detection module was work-
ing in the background, a corresponding stress value was
determined for every utterance. It is expected that the stress
detection module does not measure any stress and, there-
fore, produces stress scores of or near to zero.
6.1.3 Short-time simulations
During this exercise step, the following data were recorded
(beside other):
• Complete radar data for all aircraft.
• Given ATC clearances.
• All SACom alerts.
In addition, a psychologist observed the test person to
exactly log his or her reaction to pre-defined events.
As expected, some of the pre-defined events could not
successfully be simulated during the short-time scenarios
due to preventive actions taken by the air traffic controller.
In contrast, some unplanned aircraft deviations and even
conflict situations occurred. The majority of these
unplanned events were caused by pseudo-pilot errors, but
some were also caused by hasty controller actions without
taking the new situation into full account.
Table 2 shows in detail that a high percentage of pre-
planned events could be simulated successfully throughout
all short-time scenarios, resulting in a very good compa-
rability between the test persons.
Fig. 5 Connection between exercise steps and KPIs
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6.1.4 Long simulation
Within this scenario, a briefed person acting as a ‘‘False
ATCo’’ deliberately gives instructions to pseudo-pilots.
During this exercise step, the same data were recorded as in
the short-time simulations. In addition, the person acting as
‘‘False ATCo’’ logged every inserted fake ATC clearance
and observed the effects on the traffic flow. This person
also assessed if the intervention caused or contributed to a
safety–critical situation. Table 3 gives an overview of
given fake clearances and their effects. About 50% of all
fake clearances had no effect on the traffic flow, mainly
because the fake clearance (interfering with other utter-
ances) just led to a short block-out on the frequency. This
simply compelled the controller to repeat his instruction. In
some cases, the controller gave an alternate clearance
before the pilots were able to comply with the fake clear-
ance. Most fake clearances were recognized and corrected
by the controllers, which just caused additional workload
and delay. However, interestingly, in two cases, a safety–
critical situation could be provoked, in one case even with
causing a serious collision risk (closest proximity 1,02NM/
200 ft on nearly opposite headings).
6.1.5 Questionnaires and debriefing
Prepared questionnaires were filled out electronically and
standardized scales were used [System Usability Scale
(SUS) and SHAPE Automation Trust Index (SATI)]. This
enabled the use of automatic analysis tools, establishing
that strong comparability is achieved between trials.
The usability scale (SUS) has a range from 0 to 100,
values above 50 being considered as acceptable, and values
above 70 indicating good usability [20]. The trust scale
(SATI) ranges from 0 = ‘‘never’’ to 6 = ‘‘always’’ [21].
The de-briefing session is a last opportunity to collect
subjective impressions, opinions, and feedback which may
be the basis for further developments, improvements, and
for finding new fields of research.
6.2 Quantitative results, controller feedback,
and discussion
The following sections will state the results and conclu-
sions specific to the different SACom functions.
6.2.1 Speaker verification function
Table 4 shows the results obtained for the speaker verifi-
cation function in a very brief way.
It can be seen that the pure performance of the speaker
verification function under laboratory conditions (good
audio quality, no background noise, etc.) was very satis-
fying with a low false alarm rate and a high detection rate.
Nevertheless, the system got usability ratings between
43 (= ‘‘poor’’) and 75 (= ‘‘good’’), and the trust index got a
mean rating of 2.2 (= ‘‘sometimes’’). During the debriefing
session, the controllers stated that the reason for this is the
used HMI, which is an additional window on the screen
showing almost always non-relevant information, because
most of the transmissions were authorized. It is expected
Table 1 Validation exercise overview
Exercise ID Date Test person
VL–C1 24th/25th Aug ATCo 1 from DFS
GP–C2 21st/22nd Sept ATCo from Air Services Australia
AL1–C3 17th/18th Oct ATCo 2 from DFS
AL2–C4 18th/19th Oct ATCo 3 from DFS
AL3–C5 19th/20th Oct ATCo 4 from DFS
AL4–C6 20th/21st Oct ATCo 5 from DFS
Table 2 Successfully simulated
and unplanned events during
short-time simulations
Exercise ID Successful events Successful events (%) Unplanned events
VL–C1 17/20 85 8
GP–C2 18/20 90 7
AL1–C3 18/20 90 4
AL2–C4 16/20 80 9
AL3–C5 17/20 85 4
AL4–C6 17/20 85 1
Table 3 Inserted fake clearances and their effects
Exercise
ID
Inserted
fake
clearances
With an effect on the
traffic flow (delay)
With a safety–
critical
consequence
VL–C1 5 3 0
GP–C2 6 4 0
AL1–C3 9 3 0
AL2–C4 10 5 1
AL3–C5 6 6 0
AL4–C6 13 6 1
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that, with an HMI redesign, the usability and trust rating
can be improved significantly.
6.2.2 Stress detection function
Table 5 shows the results obtained for the stress detection
function.
The alert threshold was set to a stress score of 30 during
the exercises as this was estimated to be a suitable value
because of the results of preliminary trials.
Apart from exercise run AL4–C6, the stress detection
function unfortunately did not indicate an increased stress
score during the attack phase compared to the phase with
normal operations.
This can be interpreted in the following ways:
• The induction of stress during the simulation was not
successful.
• The classification of utterances as ‘‘compromised with
stress’’ or as ‘‘free of stress’’ is not accurate.
• The stress detection function is not sensitive enough.
• The reliability of the stress detection function depends on
the voice characteristics and is not equal for all speakers.
Separate trials with the stress detection function, which
were conducted in January 2017 in Braunschweig (results
will be published in autumn 2017), showed that the stress
detection in ATC voice communication under laboratory
conditions may be successful for some speakers, but
without the reliability which would be expected from a
security system. This stems from the fact that stress
detection from voice is still science in its infancy. As this
trend was already visible during pre-validation tests, the
stress score was not displayed to the controller during the
validation exercises. Consequently, no SATI or SUS was
filled out for the stress detection function.
6.2.3 Conformance monitoring function
Table 6 shows results obtained for the conformance mon-
itoring function.
It was recognized that most of the false alarms occurred
because of incorrect, incomplete, early or late information
about the given ATC clearances, which initially led to a
very high false alarm rate. For the result analysis, these
input errors were eliminated subsequently, resulting in a
second value for the false alarm rate representing the
amount of false alarms which really come from the system.
Consequently, two types of false alarm rates were defined
for the result analysis:
• False alarm rate type I, which is calculated from the
amount of all false alarms including those that are
caused by incorrect inputs.
• False alarm rate type II, which is calculated from the
amount of false alarms excluding those that are caused
by incorrect inputs.
The results show that the performance of the confor-
mance monitoring function was satisfying with an average
detection rate of 91.2% and an average false alarm rate
type II of 8.8%. In most exercise runs, the detection rate of
the prototype was higher than the detection rate of the air
traffic controller without support.
Another big advantage of the conformance monitoring
function is that it can detect aircraft deviations significantly
faster than the air traffic controller (25 s faster on the
average).
The system got usability ratings between 35 (= ‘‘poor’’)
and 75 (= ‘‘good’’), and the trust was rated with 2.4 on
average (= ‘‘sometimes’’). During the debriefing session,
the controllers stated that the reason for this is the high
Table 4 Speaker-verification KPIs, usability, and trust
Exercise ID Opt. alert thr. False alarm rate (%) Detection rate SUS SATI
VL–C1 15 3.3 100 NA NA
GP–C2 14–30 0 100 50 2.33
AL1–C3 27–35 0 100 43 1.67
AL2–C4 21 0 96 58 1.5
AL3–C5 31–40 0 100 75 3.33
AL4–C6 33 0 91.7 50 2.17
Average 26.25 0.55 97.95 55 2.2
Table 5 Stress detection KPIs
Exercise ID False alarm rate (%) Detection rate (%)
VL–C1 23.0 27.6
GP–C2 1.3 0.7
AL1–C3 3.1 0.6
AL2–C4 21.8 14.6
AL3–C5 20.3 23.3
AL4–C6 6.3 20.0
Average 12.6 14.5
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false alarm rate (type I) during the simulation, because
these false alarms which result from input errors cannot be
eliminated in real time.
6.2.4 Conflict detection function
Table 7 shows the results obtained for the conflict detec-
tion function in a very brief way.
As the conflict detection function uses the same data
about given ATC clearances, it is affected by incorrect
inputs in the same way as the conformance monitoring
function. Therefore, the distinction between false alarm
rate type I and false alarm rate type II (see conformance
monitoring function) applies here too.
The performance of the SACom prototype in terms of
false alarm rate (type II) and detection rate is still accept-
able, but it did not reach a performance which is compa-
rable to the one of the air traffic controller. Preventing
collisions between two aircraft is one of the main tasks of
air traffic control; therefore, the controllers are well-trained
to detect and react immediately to conflict situations.
Nevertheless, this function got very good usability rat-
ings between 55 (= ‘‘good’’) and 85 (= ‘‘excellent’’). The
average trust rating was 4.2 (= ‘‘often’’). An explanation
might be that controllers are used to all kinds of conflict
detection tools and have already years of experience in
using them. Following this, it is assumed that the attitude
towards conflict detection functions in general is much
better than towards new functions which are not yet widely
used.
6.2.5 Correlation function
Table 8 shows the results obtained for the correlation
function.
The correlation function had to be modified significantly
after exercise runs VL–C1 and GP–C2; therefore, only the
last four runs are comparable without restrictions.
The duration of the second phase of this simulation
(20 min) was defined as the phase, where an attack by an
unauthorized speaker giving false instructions was present.
Table 6 Conformance monitoring KPIs, usability, and trust
Exercise
ID
False alarm rate
type I (%)
False alarm rate
type II (%)
Detection rate
SACom (%)
Detection rate
ATCo (%)
Time until
detection SACom
Time until
detection ATCo
SUS SATI
VL–C1 63.8 10.3 88.0 92.0 16.5 41.6 NA NA
GP–C2 71.0 7.2 93.3 76.7 11.8 39.4 67.5 4
AL1–C3 34.3 2.9 95.8 91.7 15.8 43.1 75 3.83
AL2–C4 56.7 9.0 96.7 80.0 14.5 38.7 35 1
AL3–C5 58.9 12.5 88.5 84.6 13.9 38.9 40 1.33
AL4–C6 52.8 11.1 85.0 85.0 14.1 34.7 60 1.83
Average 56.3 8.8 91.2 85.0 14.4 39.4 55.5 2.4
Table 7 Conflict detection KPIs, usability, and trust
Ex. ID False alarm rate type I (%) False alarm Rate type II (%) Detect. rate SACom (%) Detect. rate ATCo (%) SUS SATI
VL–C1 66.7 0.0 80.0 100.0 NA NA
GP–C2 84.5 7.1 88.2 76.4 72.5 4.33
AL1–C3 87.7 16.7 72.7 90.9 NA NA
AL2–C4 87.9 12.5 88.9 88.9 67.5 6
AL3–C5 81.4 20.0 66.7 83.3 85 5
AL4–C6 78.8 20.0 70.0 90.0 55 1.33
Av. 81.2 12.7 77.8 88.3 70 4.2
Table 8 Correlation KPIs
Ex. ID Optimum
alert thresh.
False alarm
rate (%)
Detection
rate (%)
Time until
detect. (s)
VL–C1 118 0.0 31.6 25
GP–C2 120 38.4 61.8 278
AL1–C3 28 50.5 80.7 29
AL2–C4 20 56.9 88.7 96
AL3–C5 25 68.3 78.6 164
AL4–C6 61 16.3 89.0 44
Average
C3–C6
34 48.0 84.3 83
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The performance of the correlation function was best for
exercise run AL4–C6, but produced high false alarm rates
during the other exercise runs. These false alarm rates were
a direct consequence of false indications of the individual
SACom modules, especially because of a well-developed
aftereffect of the attack phase during exercise step 7.
The correlated score is the basis for automatic reporting
to the security management entity and was not displayed to
the controller in these validation runs. Therefore, no SATI
or SUS questionnaire was filled out.
7 Conclusions
The described SACom prototype takes into account the
security countermeasures defined during the development
phase of the GAMMA project. This prototype has the
potential to reduce risks affecting the future ATM system.
The validation example explains the way to validate if
generated security information is usable, beneficial, and
reliable for users and operators. The effectiveness of the
postulated security countermeasures was successfully
measured with the help of introduced security KPIs.
The amount of objective measurements and subjective
feedbacks of ATM experts were meaningful and compre-
hensive. Reliability can be seen as one of the most
important features of a security system or a specific secu-
rity function, which was measured using the KPIs false
alarm rate, detection rate, and time until detection.
Regarding the discussed ATM security prototype, the
adherence to the proposed ATM security management
validation methodology appears to be straightforward and
clearly focuses on the development of tailor-made valida-
tion exercises.
The used short-time simulations have shown a high
success rate in introducing numerous and comparable sit-
uations throughout the whole validation campaign. These
simulations even revealed a ‘‘weak point’’, because 4 of 6
air traffic controllers experienced a mid-air collision during
short-time scenario number 16 (see Sect. 5.3). Obviously,
air traffic controllers do rarely notice level deviations of
aircraft when they are already on the final approach using
an Instrument Landing System (ILS).
The security incident simulation, which replicates a
complete attack by an unauthorized speaker infiltrating
fake clearances, showed that the SACom prototype can
provide valuable support in handling these events and—
with reduced false alarms and improved HMI design—will
be a very helpful addition, but it cannot guarantee that
safety is always maintained.
The lack of a commonly accepted validation method-
ology for ATM security prototypes, tools, and systems
shows that the community is in dire need of defining it. The
security validation approach presented in this article has
the potential to be the sought-after construction kit and to
serve as a guideline for similar validation activities.
Acknowledgements Funding was provided by European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (Grant Agreement no. 312382).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
1. http://www.eurocontrol.int/tags/atm-security
2. SESAR ATM Security Risk Assessment Methodology, D02,
00.01.04, 02/05/2013
3. Minimum Set of Security Controls, SESAR Project 16.02.05,
D05-006, Edition 00.06.00 (2013)
4. Joint Planning and Development Office, Security Annex, ‘‘Con-
cept of operations for the next generation air transportation sys-
tem,’’ Version 2.0, Washington, DC (2007)
5. Fantacci, R., Menci, S., Micciullo, L., Pierucci, L.: A secure radio
communication system based on an efficient speech watermark-
ing approach. Secur. Commun. Netw. 2(4), 305–314 (2009)
6. Prinz, J., Sajatovic, M., Haindl, B.: S2EV—Safety and security
enhanced ATC voice system. In: IEEE Aerospace Conference,
Big Sky, MT, USA (2005)
7. Hering, H., Hagmu¨ller, M., Kubin, G.: Safety and security
increase for air traffic management through unnoticeable water-
mark aircraft identification tag transmitted with the VHF voice
communication. In: IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics System Con-
ference (DASC) (2003)
8. GAMMA Consortium.: GAMMA CONOPS, the ultimate ATM
security framework, newsletter, no 1, pp. 2–3. (2015)
9. EUROCONTROL.: European operational concept validation
methodology, version 3.0, https://www.eurocontrol.int/publica
tions/european-operational-concept-validation-methodology-
eocvm (2010). Accessed June 2015
10. Stelkens-Kobsch, T.H., Hasselberg, A., Mu¨hlhausen, T., Car-
stengerdes, N., Finke, M., Neeteson, C.: Towards a more secure
ATC voice communications system. In: Digital Avionics Systems
Conference (DASC), 2015 IEEE/AIAA 34th. Prague, Czech
Republic (2015). https://doi.org/10.1109/dasc.2015.7311419
11. Strohmeier, M., Scha¨fer, M., Pinheiro, R., Lenders, V., Marti-
novic, I.: On perception and reality in wireless air traffic com-
munication security. In: IEEE transactions on intelligent
transportation systems, vol. 18(6), pp.1338–1357. (2017)
12. International Civil Aviation Organization.: Communication Sys-
tems, Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion, vol. III, 2nd edn (2007)
13. LiveATC: Fake ATC in Action (LTBA-Istanbul).: http://www.
liveatc.net/forums/atcaviation-audio-clips/25-may-2011-fake-atc-
in-action-(ltba-istanbul) (2011). Accessed June 2015
14. The Age: Lone-Wolf Radio Hoaxer Hacks Melbourne Air Traffic
Control.: http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/lonewolf-radio-
hoaxer-hacks-melbourne-airtraffic-control-afp-20161107-gsk12o.
html (2016). Accessed Dec 2016
15. Neffe, M., Van Pham, T., Hering, H., Kubin, G.: Speaker seg-
mentation for air traffic control. In: Mu¨ller C. (eds) Speaker
A practical example for validation of ATM security prototypes
123
Classification II. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4441.
Springer, Berlin (2007)
16. EUROCONTROL.: Specification for short term conflict alert, 1.0
(edn). http://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/short-term-con
flict-alert-stca-specification (2007). Accessed July 2016
17. EUROCONTROL.: Specification for medium-term conflict
detection, 1.0 (edn). http://www.eurocontrol.int/publications/
medium-term-conflict-detection-mtcd-specification (2010).
Accessed July 2016
18. Montefusco, P., Casar, R., Stelkens-Kobsch, T.H., Koelle, R.:
Addressing security in the ATM environment. In: ARES 2016,
11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security (2016)
19. SASHA—Situation Awareness for SHAPE.: https://ext.euro
control.int/ehp/?q=node/1609 (2012). Accessed Sep 2016
20. Brooke, J.: SUS—System Usability Scale. https://measuringu.
com/sus/ (1986). Accessed Sep 2016
21. Dehn, D.M.: Assessing the impact of automation on the air traffic
controller: the SHAPE questionnaires. ATC Q. 16(2), 127–146
(2008)
22. EUROCONTROL.: A Human–Machine interface reference sys-
tem for EnRoute air traffic control (1995)
23. https://github.com/lfv-mssm/yada. Accessed March 2017
24. Helmke, H., Rataj, J., Muehlhausen, T., Ohneiser, O., Ehr, H.,
Kleinert, M., Oualil, Y., Schuldner, M., Klakow, D.: Assistant-
based speech recognition for ATM applications. In: 11th USA/
Europe Air Traffic Management Research and Development
Seminar (ATM2015), Lissabon/Portugal (2015)
M. Finke, T. H. Stelkens-Kobsch
123
